Darfur Peace Agreement Failure

With regard to the distribution of assets, the provisions of the data protection authority focus on compensation and not on Darfur`s share of national revenues or on the region`s revenues. Compensation for lives lost, property destroyed and looted and suffering caused were initially rejected by the government because it implied that the government had some responsibility for the violence it had long presented as the consequence of a purely tribal conflict. However, the final document includes the creation of a compensation commission and a fund with a $30 million commitment from the government. The agreement also allows for the creation of the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund to clean up individual repatrials. [9] Given the country`s oil resources used to finance janjaweed and the war in Darfur, the SLA/AW`s demands for more compensation funds are not inappropriate. Friday was the last of four days of negotiations on Darfur to reach a final peace agreement, in line with the 9 April agreed by conciliation. The unique model of Arab-African conflict no longer defines the armed groups involved. The initial insurgency and Arab militias were divided into a series of factions that fight against each other, against the government and between them. The continuation of peace processes contributed in part to fragmentation, as resistance movements were divided over the conditions of peace and fought over new conditions and promises to share powers and resources. The government is suspected of promoting fractionism within the resistance and weakening the influence of resistance. The government`s involvement in the peace process has also jeopardized the place of Arab militias as substitutes.

Some have chosen to step up their attacks and consolidate war-prey (such as land grabbing), while others have moved from government to resistance to demand legitimate entry into peace processes. In its rush for a peace agreement, the AU was initially accused of conducting separate bilateral talks between the regime and the factions, weakening the factions and preventing them from joining and using their common influence. [16] The AU mediation team was also accused of setting a deadline for a final peace document, without responding to the reservations of the SLA/AW group in Den Usa, Usa. While concluding the document for further discussions, the AU extended the deadline for signing the Dpa from its original target from May 2006 to July of this year. The AU also authorized the secession of political groups that refused to engage independently in favour of the DPA by producing the „declaration of support for the DPA document“, while rejecting a request by the SLA/AW group to attach a supplementary text to the DPA that responds to their requests without necessarily amending the agreement. [17] The mediators (the AU) insisted that the agreement be signed, despite the reservations of the SLA/AW and JEM groups who participated throughout the process but then refused to recognize and sign the agreement. Jem opposed the agreement because it did not meet its demands for the reorganization of the national agenda (particularly the establishment of a broad system of power-sharing and wealth distribution).